Revisiting the Separate Products Issue
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998) The Justice Department's tying claim against Microsoft Corporation boils down to one question: Is Internet Explorer a separate product from Windows 95? In United States v. Microsoft Corp.,' the government contended that Microsoft violated a consent decree by illegally tying 2 the sale of its Internet browser, Internet Explorer, to the sale of its operating software, Windows 95. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, however, held that no tying arrangement existed because the two programs were part of a single, "integrated" software product. 3 The difference between a single product and two tied products is known as the "separate products issue" in tying law. This Case Note argues that the discussion of the separate products issue in Microsoft was flawed on two levels. On a doctrinal level, the court's separate products test was not "consistent with tying law" as claimed. 4 It failed to adhere to the leading U.S. Supreme Court case on the issue, which requires courts to examine the nature of demand for two products rather than their functional relatedness when resolving the separate products question. On an analytical level, the court's test conflated the definitional question of a tie-in's existence with the question of whether a tie-in should be permissible on economic grounds. It thereby unwisely transformed the separate products test into a rule-of-reason test, which directs courts to examine the efficiencies and other benefits of a challenged arrangement. 5 The Microsoft court may have manipulated the separate products test in this manner because of a desire to move judicial analysis away from per se condemnation of tying arrangements.
The separate products issue in Microsoft first arose when the government commenced a proceeding to hold Microsoft in civil contempt of a 1994 antitrust consent decree. 6 The decree prohibited Microsoft from entering "any License Agreement in which terms of that agreement are expressly or impliedly conditioned upon.., the licensing of any other [Microsoft product] ... (provided, however, that this provision in and of itself shall not be construed to prohibit Microsoft from developing integrated products) ... .,, The government contended that Microsoft had violated this decree by tying the sale of Internet Explorer to the sale of Windows 95. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia rejected this argument, however, because it found the consent decree to be vague. 8 Nonetheless, it believed that there was a high probability that Microsoft had violated the Sherman Act by conditioning its license of Windows 95 on its license of Internet Explorer. In response, the court issued a preliminary injunction to prohibit this practice.'
A three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit reversed. It unanimously found that the district court had issued the injunction without providing adequate notice. 10 Two of the judges on the panel further argued that the injunction was invalid because it was based on an erroneous reading of the consent decree. The decree forbade Microsoft from conditioning the sale of one product on the sale of another unless the two products added up to an "integrated product."' The two-judge majority argued that Internet this analysis is an examination of efficiencies. If an arrangement is necessary to achieve significant efficiencies in production, distribution, or development, a court undergoing a rule-ofreason analysis will balance these procompetitive effects against the arrangement's anticompetitive effects when deciding the legality of an arrangement. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 69 (4th ed. 1997). v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV. A. 94-1564 , 1995 WL 505998 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1995 Explorer and Windows 95 constituted an integrated product rather than a tie of two separate ones since their combination had "facially plausible benefits to its integrated design." 2 It also contended that this finding was "consistent with tying law," citing Areeda's influential treatise, which explains that "new products integrating functionalities in a useful way should be considered single products regardless of market structure." 3 The majority concluded that the government failed to show a reasonable probability of success in its antitrust suit to warrant a preliminary injunction against Microsoft, because a tying arrangement must at a minimum involve two products.
See United States

II
After the decision regarding the consent decree, the Justice Department commenced a Sherman Act proceeding against Microsoft, claiming among other things that the company had illegally tied Windows 95 and Internet Explorer in an attempt to monopolize the Internet browser market. 14 The separate products analysis in Microsoft suggests that the D.C. Circuit may reject this claim if and when it hears the claim on appeal. Even though the consent decree did not embody "the entirety of the Sherman Act or even all 'tying' law under the Act," 5 the Microsoft court acknowledged that the decree "emerged from antitrust claims,"' 6 and that its understanding of "integrated products" was "consistent with tying law." 17 This suggests that the D.C. Circuit may apply a similar separate products analysis and hold that Windows 95 and Internet Explorer are two parts of an integrated product rather than two tied products. 8 The possibility that the Microsoft analysis will be used in the Sherman Act proceeding makes it important to consider its substantive weaknesses.
12. Id. at 950.
13. Id (citing 10 PHILLIPAREEDA ETAL., ANTrIRUSTLAW 1746b, at 227-28 (1996) 18. Lower courts are not required to give deference to the Microsoft separate products discussion for the purposes of antitrust analysis because: (1) the discussion was dicta and unnecessary to the decision about the preliminary injunction; and (2) the Microsoft court did not claim that its efficiency test was the proper test for antitrust law generally. Nonetheless, the court did not suggest that its test was an improper test for antitrust law. The court, in fact, believed that its test "was consistent with tying law." Id
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A. The Doctrinal Flaw of Microsoft
In Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 19 the U.S. Supreme Court held that "the answer to the question whether one or two products are involved turns not on the functional relation between them but rather on the character of demand for the two items." 20 Two products exist when the two product markets are "distinguishable in the eyes of buyers,"'" and when there is sufficient demand for the tied product separate from the tying product so that it is "efficient" to offer them separately. 22 The functional relatedness of two items is not in itself sufficient to determine whether they constitute one or two products. The Court noted that prior tying cases involved products that were functionally linked, and that this linkage was never sufficient to show that only one product was involved.
The discussion of separate products in Microsoft was at odds with this test. Claiming that its view was "consistent with tying law," the two-judge majority explained that an integrated product is "a product that combines functionalities... in a way that offers advantages unavailable if the functionalities are bought separately and combined by the purchaser." 24 The majority's separate products test was thus two-pronged. First, an "integrated" product confers benefits that are unavailable if the component parts are bought separately. Second, an "integrated" product provides benefits that cannot be achieved easily by consumers who purchase the components separately. The test ignored Jefferson Parish's directive to examine consumer perception and not functionalities when making the separate products inquiry.
In a separate opinion, Circuit Judge Wald suggested as an alternative that courts balance two factors when resolving the separate products issue: (1) the benefits consumers receive from integration; and (2) the size of consumer demand for the products provided separately.' If there is great evidence of distinct markets, the defendant must show great consumer gain to justify integrating the two products. 26 resembled that of Jefferson Parish because it examined the separate demand for two products. Nonetheless, even this test was doctrinally flawed. The Supreme Court in Jefferson Parish neither examined integrative efficiencies nor engaged in any type of balancing when it made the separate products determination. Its discussion consisted of little more than finding that the products in question could be offered separately and would be purchased if offered as such. The claimed benefits of an "integrated" relationship were irrelevant to whether the arrangement involved two distinct products.
Both the two-judge majority and Judge Wald seemed to believe that an examination of functionalities and efficiencies was necessary to resolve the consent decree's disparate treatment of MS-DOS/Windows 3.11 and Windows 95. The decree prohibited Microsoft from tying the operating software of MS-DOS with the graphical interface of Windows 3.11. However, it permitted the company to produce Windows 95, which combined functions of MS-DOS and Windows 3.11.27 The court felt that an examination of integrative efficiencies was necessary to resolve the dissimilar treatment. It reasoned that the consent decree treated MS-DOS and Windows 3.11 as separate products because their combination did not provide significant consumer benefits. By contrast, the decree treated Windows 95 as an "integrated" product because the combination of the component parts conferred substantial efficiencies unavailable if consumers had purchased the parts separately.
The Jefferson Parish test, however, can adequately explain why MS-DOS and Windows 3.11 were treated as two products while Windows 95 was treated as one. At the time of the consent decree, a significant number of consumers differentiated between MS-DOS and the graphical interface of Windows 3 . 1 1 .' The presence of competing operating system software to be used with Windows 3.11 also indicated that it was efficient for Microsoft to provide DOS and Windows separately. supra note 28, at A16 (explaining that consumers probably differentiated between the graphical interface and operating system in 1990 but no longer do so today); see also Veit, supra note 28 (noting that DOS will gradually fade away because of the growing popularity of Windows 95 and newer Windows systems). The trend suggests that the two items may no longer be separate products for antitrust purposes. Product definitions under Jefferson Parish are time-sensitive because consumer perceptions may change over time. This temporal sensitivity may have the perverse effect of encouraging manufacturers to tie separate products, with the intention that the tie will change consumer perception and transform the tie into a single product. Despite this potential incentive, the Jefferson Parish approach is superior to an examination of integrative efficiencies because it permits consumers, rather than courts, to determine the benefits of tying two products through their purchasing power.
31. In general, people distinguish between operating system software, which manages the internal functions of a computer such as storing and retrieving data, and application software, which performs familiar functions such as word processing and spreadsheet operations. See, e.g., June 29, 1998 , at A25 (noting that Internet browsers have been offered as separate products for years and that consumers have "no expectation that browsers would light up the first screen when a user boots up the computer").
See Netscape Lost Market Share to Microsoft in 1st
Half of '98, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1998, at B12 (reporting on a survey that placed Netscape's market share at 42%). Netscape's market share was even greater at the beginning of the Microsoft case. See Kara Swisher, Online: After a Life at Warp Speed, Netscape Logs off, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 1998 , at B1 (placing Netscape's browser market share at 57.6% in the third quarter of 1997).
33. In Kodak, the Supreme Court found that evidence that two products are sold separately in the past and continue to be offered separately is sufficient to establish that it is "efficient" to offer them separately. See 504 U.S. at 462 (noting that "the development of the entire high-technology service industry is evidence of the efficiency of a separate market for service").
two products separately because "[s]oftware code by its nature is susceptible to division and combination."' In sum, the separate demand for Windows and Internet browsers, the existence of competitors that offer the Internet browser alone, and the ease with which Windows and Internet Explorer can be offered separately suggest that the programs are tied products rather than two parts of a single, integrated product.
B. The Analytical Flaw of Microsoft
It is unclear why all three judges examined the efficiencies and benefits of combining two products together when resolving the separate products issue. On an analytical level, this examination conflated the separate products test with the rule-of-reason test. It transformed a simple definitional inquiry into a question of whether a tying arrangement should be permissible on economic grounds.
The Microsoft court may have engaged in such analysis because the Supreme Court currently applies per se treatment to tying arrangements' By incorporating elements of the rule of reason into the separate products test, the Microsoft court effectively avoided the effects of per se treatment without explicitly rejecting that treatment. The court may have reasoned that the manipulation of a multi-faceted and somewhat ambiguous separate products test would less likely be challenged than the rejection of a straightforward and clear per se rule.
Many commentators have criticized the application of the per se rule to tying arrangements," and it is unclear whether the Supreme Court will continue to use the rule if the issue comes before the Court again. 37 Even if the Supreme Court eventually decides to apply the rule of reason to tying arrangements, the question of whether one or two products are involved should be kept separate from the question of whether a tie-in is permissible on economic grounds. Collapsing the two would make the rule of reason superfluous: Courts would have to examine the efficiencies of an arrangement at both the separate products determination stage and the ruleof-reason analysis stage. Regardless of the type of analysis applied to tying arrangements, therefore, courts should continue to follow the Jefferson Parish approach to the separate products issue. Jefferson Parish not only provides a clear standard for judges to follow, but it also separates two analytically distinct issues that are often entangled in tying law.
-David K. Lam on the Court, joined the dissent in Kodak, which suggests that they would follow Justice O'Connor's view of the separate products problem. 38. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 39-40 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., 737 F.2d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 1984 ) (noting that "the practice has been to classify a product as a single product if there are rather obvious economies of joint provision"). Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist, argued that anesthesia and other hospital services should not be seen as separate products since the advantages of combining the two-advantages such as 24-hour anesthesiology coverage, standardization of procedures, flexible scheduling, and more efficient monitoring-made it reasonable to treat the packaged services as a single product. Justice O'Connor made several valid observations regarding market power and efficiencies. Her analysis, however, is inappropriate for the separate products test in Microsoft for two reasons. First, she assumed that tying law should be subject to the rule of reason. Her analysis is therefore improper for per se analysis, which the Supreme Court currently uses to examine tying arrangements. Second, she collapsed the separate products issue and rule-of-reason analysis into one. Her separate products analysis therefore amounted to an examination of whether a tie-in should be permissible on efficiency grounds.
